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H5GEMONIC MASCULINITY: THE tASE OF THE US NAVY 
The Organizational Construction 
of Hegemonic Masculinity: 
The Case of the US Navy 
Frank J. Barrett* 
This article examines the construction of hegemonic masculinity within the US Navy. 
Based on life history interviews with 27 male officers, this study explores alternative 
discourses and identities of officers from three different communities in the Navy: 
aviation, surface warfare, and the supply corps. Definitions of masculinity are relationally 
constructed through associations of difference: aviators tend to draw upon themes of 
autonomy and risk taking; surface warfare officers draw upon themes of perseverance 
and endurance; and supply officers draw upon themes of technical rationality. Further, 
these masculinities depend upon various contrasting definitions of femininity. Finally, 
this article explores a series of contradictions that threaten the secure construction of 
masculinity within this military culture. 
Following the growth of women's studies and feminist approaches to research, an. 
interest in the critical study of men - in 
'Naming Men as ~!en'.(Collinson and Heam 
1994) - has emerged. Studies of masculinity 
in various social institutions, have prob-
Iematized the construction of masculinity and 
have made men 1·isible as a social category. 
This includes the study of men and crime 
(Messerschmidt 1993); men in the printing 
press industry (Cockburn 1983); men in 
financial service institutions (Kerfoot and 
Knights 1993); male engineers on the shop 
floor (Collinson 1988) and studies of sports 
and masculinity C\!essner 1992; Messner and 
Sabo 1990; Klein 1993). · 
The military is a prime candidate for the 
study of masculinity, not only because it is 
an institution populated with men, but also 
because it plays a primary role in shaping 
images of masculinity in the larger society 
(Connell 1992; ll!organ 1994). Following 
Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978), 'The military 
has socialized millions of inen according to 
some traditional blueprint. As such the dom-
inant adult male role model could largely be 
the product of the military, P!'rticularly in as 
much as those who are thus socialized have 
returned to society' (p. 167). 
Militaries around the world have defined 
the soldier as an embodiment of traditional 
male sex role behaviors. From recruiting 
?OSters that seek 'a few good men' to popular 
:nedia images of John Wayne fearlessly 
leading the troops in a World War II battle, 
Tom Cruise as a 'top gun' pilot, or Sylvester 
Stallone as Rambo single-handedly rescuing 
American prisoners of war, there has long 
been an association between the military and 
images of masculinity. 
This study applies some of the analytic in-
sights of critical men's studies to understand 
the construction of masculinity within the 
US Navy. This article explores how the Navy 
reproduces an ideology of hegemonic mascu-
linity and how male officers' concrete prac-
tices and choices construct an order of gender 
relations. After .reviewing a few of the core 
themes in the new critical men's study, I will 
deconstruct the notion of monolithic mascu-
linity associated witjl the military and explore 
a number of alternative masculine discourses 
and identities that male officers construct in 
this culture. In particular, I will show how 
the various constructions· of masculinity vary 
across job specialties. In doing so, I will argue 
that these versions of masculinity are rela-
tionally constructed through associations of 
difference. I seek to show how ~definitions of 
masculinity emerge within collective prac-
tices, definitions that reside as much within 
organizational patterns and practices as with-
in individual personalities. Finaliy, I explore 
some of the contradictions within the Navy's 
gender regime. The view here is that gender 
is an actively constructed social accomplish-
ment. Following Morgan's (1994) call to study 
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this study reveals that the link between 
masculinity, violence, and the military is 
more complex than the image of 'man the 
warrior' might suggest. 
The gender order and masculine 
hegemony 
From the perspective of social construction-
ism, there is an important distinction between 
the categories of sex and gender. Sex refers to 
the biological categories 'male' and 'female'. 
But gender is a social organizing principle, a. 
human invention like language, that organ-
izes life in culturally patterned ways. Gender 
is an institution that structures· social rela-
tionships and upholds and reproduces rules 
and patterns of expectation. Most of us learn 
to comply with these rules and experience 
them as natural and common sense. How-
ever, these structures have no validity other 
than through the daily practices and actions 
that people engage in. Human beings are 
agents, whose actions and practices either 
accomplish or challenge. the taken-for-
granted gender norms and expectations. 
Human beings actively accomplish, or 'do 
gender' (West and Zimmerman 1987) contin-
uously - in the way we talk, walk, shake 
hands, and dress. But we 'do' these activities 
within the context of larger social patterns. 
Hence, the relationship between individual 
practices and larger social structures is recur-
sive. Following Lorber (1994), 'The social 
reproduction of gender in individuals repro-
duces the gendered societal structure; as 
individuals act out gender norms and expec-
tation_s in face-to-face interaction, they are 
constructing gendered systems of dominance 
and power' (p. 6). 
The concept 'masculinity', then, is not a 
genetic instinct or a stable role set (see 
Connell 1987). Masculinity is embedded 
within an ensemble of social practices, sym-
bols, discourses, and ideologies associated 
with the category of 'man'. In a landmark art-
icle, Carrigan, Connell, and Lee (1985), called 
for further study of a range of masculinities 
differentiated by structures of power dyn-
amics, by different rules of emotional attach-
ment, and by different rules regarding the 
division of labor. The term 'hegemony' orig-
inates with Gramsci' s notion of class relations 
and refers to the dynamic process by which 
groups create and sustain power, how 
'normal' definitions and taken-for-granted 
expressions come to define situations. Hege-
mony goes beyond the material holding of · 
power and refers to the process by which 
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'normal' and ideal definitions emerge, how 
the terms of morality surface and persuade. 
The term 'hegemonic masculinity' refers to· 
a particular idealized image of masculinity in 
relation to which images of femininity and 
other masculinities are marginalized and sub-
ordinated. The hegemonic ideal of masculinity 
in current Western culture is a man who is 
independent, risk-taking, aggressive, hetero-
sexual, and rational (Connell 1995). lt is impor-
tant to recognize that hegemonic masculinity 
is not the same as stereotypical sex roles, how-
ever. Critical men1s studies refer to a dynamic 
conception of a gender order (Connell 1987; 
Messner and Sabo 1990) as a structure of 
social relations that are historically variable. 
Rotundo (1993), for example, traces the his-
torical changes in American images of mas-
culinity. Roper and Tosh (1991) trace the 
changing images of masculinity in England 
since the 19th century. These studies empha-
size how hegemonic versions of masculinity 
achieve meaning within patterns of differ-
ence. They examine contrasting dichotomies 
such as reason/feeling, and mind/body, as 
well as various constructions of the 'other', 
contrasting images of masculinity with images 
of the child and the feminine (Roper and Tosh 
1991). 
Masculine hegemony refers not only to the 
various groupings of men and the ideals they 
uphold. It refers also to the process by which 
these groups and ideals form, the organiza-
tional situations and constraints that shape 
and construct these ideals and groups. 
Cockburn's (1983) study of British printing 
press workers illustrates this process: when 
new technology changed work procedures, 
systematic efforts were made to exclude 
women from the trade and to marginalize 
other categories of younger and unskilled 
men in order to sustain a definition of print-
ing as a 1masculine' occupation. Messner's 
(1992) study of professional athletes and 
Klein's (1993) enthnographic study of profes-
sional body builders reveal that men produce 
a variety of masculinities as they struggle 
toward the hegemonic ideal that few of them 
can attain, and even fewer can sustain, in the 
face of such obstacles as competition, failure, 
injury, or retirement. Kerfoot and Knights 
(1993) demonstrate how paternalistic and 
competitive masculine discourses within the 
UK financial service industry reproduce a 
variety of masculinizing practices and ident-
ity maintenance strategies. Messerschmidt 
(1993) studies how criminal actions are one 
form of accomplishing masculinity that. var-
ies by class differences, from accommodating 
to opposition masculinities as a means to 
secure identity. These studies deconstruct a 
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10nolithic image of masculinity and outline 
variety of alternative masculinities and strat-
gies various groups .of men use to create, 
egotiate, and maintain a masculine identity. 
In many of these studies, subjectivity and 
lentity are essential themes. Power relations, 
iscourses, ideologies, and practices produce 
11tltiple- and sometimes contradictory mas-
llline identities (Collinson and Hearn 1994). 
!any of these studi.es discuss the precarious 
ature of masculine identities that must 
e achieved, negotiated, and contested in. 
ay-to-day interaction (Kerfoot .and Knights 
'l93). Because every gender regime has 
1ternal contradictions between ideology and 
ractice, a relational theory of masculinity 
1ust identify how men work through these 
mtradictions and challenges to achieving a 
:cure identity. For example, if the hegemonic 
!eal of masculinity involves an image of 
1gged. heterosexuality, independence, and 
>ughness, how do these men carve out an 
!entity in an organizational world in which 
1uch day-to-day work neither demands nor 
'lows for these displays? 
1etlzods 
his study focuses on three themes: the con-
ruction of masculinity in the lives of male 
aval officers; the differentiation of mascu-
11ities within various sites within· the Navy; 
>w these men draw upon themes of hege-
tonlc masculinity to negotiate their various 
cganizational situations, This study employs 
life-history method of research. The 
rength of this method is that it documents 
>cial structures and institutional change in 
ldition to personal practices. In using life 
story methodology, Connell (1995) cites 
1rtre's (1963) concept of personal practice as 
project developing through time in which 
icial structure, institutional change~ and 
?rsonal life intersect. 
Within the US Navy there are three combat 
1ecialties (surface warfare, aviation, and 
1bniarine warfare) and numerous 'support' 
immunities (including supply corps, med-
al corps, intelligence, and general unre-
dcted line). This is part of a larger study in 
hich 58 life history interviews were 
inducted with male naval officers from each 
' these communities. This study reports on a 
tbset of those officers and focuses on the 
ynamics of three communities: aviation, 
irface warfare, and supply corps. Ten cases 
om the aviation and surface warfare com-
1unities were analyzed for this study; seven 
1ses from the supply community were ana-
·zed. The predominant rank of these officers 
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was lieutenant junior grade, liebtenant and 
lieutenant commander, the approximate 
equivalent of middle managers. 
Each subject was asked to discuss concrete 
incidents in his life as he passed through 
various social institutions - family, school, 
career··- and significant events in his career · 
path in the Navy. In particular each was 
asked to focus on the nature of various jobs, 
positions and dutie~, the quality of relation-
ships with peers, subordinates, and bosses. 
The interview lasted between one hour and 
two and a half hours. Each interview was 
tape-recordea and transcribed, generating 
over 1,000 pages of transcripts. In addition to 
the interview data, as a civilian member of a 
naval institution, I had unique access to the 
inner workings of the culture. I was privy 
to informal interactions in the classroom, 
at meals, in the gym, and at various social 
gathe~ings, arenas whe_re identities ·were 
being constructed, displayed and contested. I 
developed personal fdendships with officers 
from the vadous communities, and these men 
often became my informants. When I was 
puzzled about certain themes or wished to 
explore something further, I would often 
meet with them over lunch or dinner to ask . 
about .the implications of a theme I was 
pursuing. 
In analyzing this data, my first and basic 
unit of analysis was the single case study; I 
wrote up and analyzed each individual case; 
In analyzing life histories, a theory of social 
structure must serve as guide. I followed 
Connell's (1987) theory that gender practices 
form patterns within three substructures: 
relations of power, division of labor and rules 
regarding emotional attachment. Each case 
history was intensively studied along these 
themes. 
Following individual case analyses, groups 
of cases from various sites within the Navy 
were constructed and analyzed for common 
themes, using a method of constant compar-
ison (Glaser and Strauss 1967) to differentiate 
between groups. In an effort to draw a 
preliminary sketch of the gender order within 
the US Navy I began to look for patterns of 
collective practices. I paid particular attention 
to the dynamics of the construction of the 
hegemonic ideal of masculinity: how indi-
viduals identified with certain masculinities 
and differentiated themselves from others, 
and how they differentiated themselves from 
forms of femininity.· 
Using qualitative data to supply sirnilari' 
ties within groups as well as differences 
between groups is sometimes difficult. As 
common themes emerged within each of the 
locations, their meaning was continuously 
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checked for relevance against individual life 
cases. To document the main themes, I have 
selected details from a few of the cases to 
illuminate experiences at various sites within 
the organization. I also provide detail to gi\·e 
a flavor of the variations and alternatives 
available to these men. 
In every interview, confidentiality was 
promised. For this reason, the names of par· 
ticular officers that appear in this article are 
fictitious. 
These interviews were conducted between 
1992 and 1994. During this period, two trends 
affecting the US military were relevant to this 
study. In the post-cold-war era, the US Na,·y 
has been downsizing and integrating women 
into combat positions. From a total acfa·e 
duty enrollment of 509, 950 in 1993, the Na\:' 
is projected to decrease to 394,000 by 1999. 
The total number of ships the CS NO\:· 
deployed in 1990 was 575 (George 1992). This 
includes aircraft carriers, attack submarines, 
surface combatants, amphibious ships, and 
support ships. The projection is that these 
will decrease to 330 by 1999. The number of 
deployable aircraft carriers will reduce from 
14 in 1990 to 11 in 1995. 
In addition to this downsizing, a 1994 pol-
icy change allows women to assume duties of 
operational combat positions, including the 
positions on surface war ships and fighter 
planes. Of the 64,430 active duty na,·al 
officers, 8,364 are women. While most of 
these women currently hold positions in 
administration and health care, the Naw 
anticipates that more women officers wiil 
be int~grated into warfare specialties. One 
consequence of these trends is that men are 
competing for fewer positions. 
Constructing masculinity in the 
US Navy 
1. Masculinity as discipline, perseverance, 
and toughness · 
Various studies of military training reveal 
that the military persuasively bounds off the 
recruit from civilian life in an effort to 
socialize 'boys to be men'. Recruits learn the 
value of appearance, cleanliness, exacting 
detail, and respect for rank and tradition. 
They come to value conformity and obedi· 
ence, and learn display rules for exhibiting 
aggression and courage in the face of risk 
Like Goffman's notion of a total institution 
(Goffman 1961), socialization is pervash·e: 
recruits are 'cut off from the wider society', 
and live in an enclosed 'formally administered 
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round of life' (p. xiii). Lovell's (1964) study 
of the professional socialization of cadets at 
West Point and Zurcher's (1967) study of 
recruits' nine week indoctrination in Navy 
basic training (boot camp), discuss the delib· 
erate efforts to shape recruits into becoming 
what janowitz (1960) calls 'professionals in 
violence' (p. 3~ From small rituals such as 
shaving heads and discarding civilian clothes 
for uniforms, -to warrior initiation rites, 
violent drill instructors, hazing rituals, sex 
education films on the harms of venereal 
disease, recruits learn that there is 'a cult of 
toughness and masculinity traditionally asso-
ciated with making soldiers out of civilians'. 
They are taught that the proper response to 
tests they face is to exhibit 'courage, endur-
ance, toughness, and lack of squeamishness' 
(Stouffer et al. 19.!9, p. 156). 
Throughout all communities in the Navy, 
the image of masculinity that is perpetuated 
involves physical toughness, the endurance 
of hardships, aggressiveness, a rugged hetero-
sexuality, unemotional logic, and a refusal to 
complain. And yet it is never assumed that 
such character traits are permanent. Indeed, 
the Navy creates structures and routines that 
call for continual testing of these qualities. 
This is a culture that chronically creates trials 
that separate the 'weak' from the rest. From 
the first day of training, the culture creates a 
testing ground that creates boundaries ·of 
inclusion around those who exhibit strength, 
endurance and competence. Passing these 
early tests is a sign that one is capable of 
perseverance and toughness. One lieutenant, 
john Baker, came from a working class back-
ground and joined the Navy after college 
because it offered a good career opportunity. 
He found the experience of Basic Training lo 
be challenging, but affirming: 'At OCS [ Offi-
cers Candidate School], it was very demand-
ing, it required a lot of discipline. I loved it. 
We started with 23 and ended with eight. We 
got very close. I'm a person who doesn't quit.' 
Many officers echoed the feelings of Lt. 
Baker, who embraces the experience of 'not 
quitting', of exhibiting the rugged discip.line 
that separated a select group from those who 
quit. Lt. Tom Knorr grew up in Kansas and 
graduated from college with a degree in 
engineering. While in college, he volunteered 
for a few years as a paramedic. He felt a lack 
of direction in his life. An influential moment 
occurred when he saw the movie, 'An Officer 
and a Gentleman' and saw the military as a 
career that would give his life discipline and 
direction. In particular, he decided to become 
a pilot because 'In a jet you're the one in 
charge'. He learned very quickly that Officers 
Candidate School (OCS) would not be easy. 
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[OCS] was tough, but there was no way I 
would quit. I cut all my ties to the past 
when I left. I figured, I'm at OCS now, I 
can't quit. If I quit and went back home 
after six months people would wonder 
why, they'd think I was a quitter. I couldn't 
face those questions. They overload you at 
OCS. Every day you have two hours of 
physical training. Mentally you're thrown 
in situations you're not familiar with. 
You're stripped of your identity. You either 
make it or you don't survive. Some people 
quit. I wasn't going to quit. Even if I was 
last, no one would call me a quitter. What 
we learned to say was, you can strip every: 
thing away, but you can't touch my pride. 
Masculinity achieves meaning within 
pa ttems of differences. If success for men is 
associated with 'not quitting' in the face of 
hardships, femin.inity becomes associated 
with quitting, complaining, and weakness. 
This follows Kimmel's (1994) notion that def-
initions of masculinity depend on changing 
definitions of women and gay men who serve 
as th,e ·'others' against which heterosexual 
men construct and project an identity. In fact, 
there is a trad.ition in the ~ilitary of reserving 
the labels associated with femininity for 
the 'other' (Enloe 1990; Strange 1983; Jeffords 
1989). In many of the world's armies, for 
example, it is a tradition to insult a potential 
or defeated enemy by calling him a 'woman' 
(Enloe 1990; Strange 1983). During the Viet- · 
nam War, US Marines often depicted the 
5outh Vietnamese Army as 'faggots' because 
they were reluctant to engage in combat 
(Levy 1992). Association of fear, passivity, 
and the feminine was sometimes extended to 
American soldiers who were afraid to fight in 
.World War II (Gray 1959). In basic training, 
drill instructors sometimes called marine 
recruits 'faggots' to imply that they lack the 
aggression associated with masculinity (Levy 
1992). 
The subjects for this study confirmed this. 
They reported that, from the first day of train-
ing, recruits who complain or do not keep up 
with the others are the. targets of gendered 
insults: they are called girls, pussies, weenies, 
and wimps by the instructors. Often, while 
marching, the instructor leads the men in 
songs that demean women as weak and 
feeble. 
However, in the 1990s, more women are 
being integrated into the Navy, creating a 
challenge to the traditional image of the male 
warrior. If these grueling tests separate the 
mei;i from the boys, what does it mean if . 
a woman can pass them? One way that 
men transform this contradiction is through 
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constructions of women as .Physically weak 
and unable to do what men do. . 
The association between weakness and 
women was reproduced in stories that 
officers. told about women officers during 
training. Every officer interviewed· had some 
story to tell about women who could not 
endure the hardships associated with military 
life. One officer remarked that women cannot 
tolerate the same stress that he and his male 
colleagues can: 
We do this fitness test - you have to hang 
from a bar. Some women hang there and 
just quit when it hurts instead of enduring 
the pain for 45 seconds or so. They'd just 
stop when it hurt. In boot camp you have to 
endure the pain or you go home. That's 
why women can't do combat. 
Many of the officers spoke in metaphors of 
surrender and relinquishment when discuss-
ing. women. They talked about women who 
'folded', who 'gave in' or 'fell out', expressions 
that invoke an image of someone collapsing 
from the weight of something they carmot 
handle. Like helicopter pilot Lt. Ted Smith, 
many officers recalled that the women had to 
be given easier physical tests: 
In flight school we had this obstacle course. 
We thought we were in great shape, but 
running in sand is tough. You have to go 
over this 6 foot wall. The women didn't 
have to do any of that. They could .run 
· around the wall Men who couldn't do it 
had to go back and do it over. 
Many men told stories about women who 
'got off easy'. One officer discussed the differ-
ence between the men who endured and the 
women who 'fell out'. 
Some good [male] officers [came] out of 
there. The good ones were up front, intelli-
. gent, had good physical prowess, didn't 
fall out on marches. They didn't have to 
be brought in 9n a truck like some of the 
women. They [the women] just . lose 
credibility when they fall out on physical 
exercises. They lined the roads. 
The 'good ones' achieves a meaning of 'up 
front', 'intelligent', physically powerful 
through a gendered contrast to the women 
who surrendered to. the stress of the OCS 
tests. By engaging in a collective interpretive 
practice, the men reach a consensus that what 
constitutes pride is associated with 'not quit-
ting'. Passing these tests constitutes member-
ship in an elite, seemingly homogenous 
group. 
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You succeed or fail as a unit. There's a lot of 
stress. Like one day, you're doing trench 
assault. It's hot and humid. One of the 
colonels would say, 'That's horrible. Do it 
again.' You're tired, you've been crawling 
for hundreds of yards ... When you're 
done, you have a beer together and say, 
'Look what we just did'. We live or die 
together. We put our lives into each other's 
hands. 
Many officers described such ritualized 
collective celebration as occasions to re-live 
the experience. The colonel's humiliating 
exhortations are superseded by the group's 
re-affirmation: they talk to each other in codes 
that only a select group could understand, to 
remind one another that they did it, they did not 
quit. Those men who drop out of the training 
and those who appear unable to pass these 
gnteling tests help define those who do pass 
as strong, competent, reliable, members of an 
exclusive dub. Lt. Smith continued: 'This is 
like a big boys club. It's the varsity ... There's 
a status to being here. You know that other 
guys ... passed the same tests. They're with 
you. They're your peers. It's a boys club. It's 
the elite. You earned it.' The telling and retel-
ling of stories, the collective sense making 
that produces a communal feeling, maintains 
the boundaries and legitimates the status of 
those who pass the tests. By reproducing 
stories of women who quit or 'stop when it 
hurts', the integration of women into the 
Navy is less likely to dilute the tough image 
associated with the ideology of masculinity. 
One privilege of membership includes the 
freedom to continue aggressive and crude 
language, to go beyond barriers of a more 
'civil' society. Within an all male group, the 
men are permitted to 'be like boys', to swear, 
tease one another. The officer above contin-
ued: 'If you make a mistake, others heckle 
you, needle you. There are no barriers, you're 
free to be rude to each other. It's part of the 
boys dub. But with women, you have to be a 
gentleman, you feel ill at ease. You can't do 
that stuff.' Having to be 'a gentleman' around 
women invokes a patriarchal masculinity 
(Kerfoot and Knights 1993) and differentiates 
men from women, furthering the sense that 
women are 'soft' and need to be protected 
from the 'hard' rudeness and incivility that 
the other men can tolerate. Engaging in 'im-
proper' behavior is a socially differentiated 
staging area that constitutes friendship, 
status, and self-identity. As in Fine's (1986) 
study of the 'dirty play of little boys', this be-
havior does not represent a personal, destruc-
tive impulse as much as a 'showing off' in 
the presence of others (Fine, p. 140). Like the 
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men in Collinson's (1988) study of engineer-
ing culture, these men secure a masculine 
identity and achieve group acceptance by tol-
erating degrading and humiliating remarks. 
2. Naval aviators: masculinity as laking 
risks in the face of danger 
·The specialty that evokes the highest status 
among naval officers is aviation. Nicknamed 
'fly boys' and 'airedales', pilots come closest 
to embodying the ideal of hegemonic mascu~ 
linity. They represent aggressiveness, tech-
nical mastery of complex machinery, courage, 
and autonomy - a traditional preserve of 
men (Hacker 1989; Cockburn 1985). As one 
pilot said, 'At the age of 26 I was flying this 
multi-million dollar aircraft on my own. I had 
all this technology in my hands.' In addition 
pilots have a reputation for boldness, irrever-
ence, aggressive heterosexual activity. There 
are numerous stories about aviators attending 
wild, drunken parties, engaging in anony-
mous heterosexual relations. Each of the 
aviators interviewed confirmed that his life 
is marked by a degree of recklessness and 
wildness and each attributed this risk-taking 
behavior to the danger associated with flying. 
Many echoed the words of one pilot who . 
said: 'Each time we go out, we never know if 
we1) be back ... So, we live for today. We do 
tend to be wild and take more risks. It's a 
mortality thing'. After a recent fatal crash of 
an F-18 jet, one pilot joked: 'We're aviators. 
We laugh in the face of de.a th'. 
All of the aviators discussed the thrill they 
experience when flying. In particular, they 
enjoy the moments of autonomy, the freedom 
to lea\·e the base or the ship and fly through 
open space. Lt. Hanks, navigator aboard an 
anti-submarine aircraft said: 
We'd launch at 5 a.m. chasing subs. It was 
exciting. Decisions are made based on data 
you feed back. We'd be out for 6 hours, tum 
off the radar, the ship didn't know where 
we were. We climbed above the clouds. 
It was fun, like a video game in real life. It 
was awesome. 
For those who engaged in combat, the 
experiences were unforgettable. The three 
officers interviewed who had flown in 
combat missions recalled them as the most 
intense experiences of their lives: 
Flying combat in the Gulf was an incredible 
high. It cheapens the experience to even 
talk about it. I was totally in tune with my 
surroundings ... It was synergy ... We flew 
at 10 feet (above ground) because of all 
the oil smoke, so we were going at aver 
<C Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996 
HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY: THE CASE OF THE US NAVY !.33 
110 miles an hour at 10 feet above the 
ground , .. One day we flew the entire 
length and breadth of Kuwait in one day. 
You could see the incre<lible devastation, 
the burned out tanks, the bodies. It was 
awesome ; .. If you hit a telephone wire, 
you were dead. So I was totally in tune 
with my surroun<lings. I was the right guy 
at the right time. I was very scared. It was 
like a great video game and I had the keys 
to the car. 
This aviator's feelings of transcendence 
and vitality render this experience almost 
inexpressible ('it cheapens it to even talk 
about it'). This is language usually reserved 
for the sacred. The passion and intensity 
surrounding this passage echo Gray's (1959) 
recollections of combat in World War II in 
which he recalls the experience of being 
completely outside himself, feeling 'ecstasy', 
'powerful· fascination', in language that 
borders on eroticism. following Hacker 
(1989) and Game and Pringle (1983) such 
feelings of power associated with operating 
'hard' technology mark this as an area of male 
preserve. Following Connell's (1995) notion 
that masculinity practices serve as ideologies 
that blur contradictions, the erotic pleasure 
the pilots find in 'playing' these real-life high-
tech video games displaces their awareness 
that people are being killed and maimed. 
The elite status of the aviators 'is institu-
tionalized. Their specialty is, in fact, the high-
est paid in the Navy. In addition to receiving 
a special $250 monthly stipend, called 'flight 
pay', above the base salary commensurate 
with their rank, after five years they receive 
an additional $650 per month, a bonus that 
increases incrementally. with tenure. Other 
naval officers single out jet pilots as the 
Navy's elite, the object of jealousy and resent-
ment from surface warfare officers who feel 
that they live under much harsher conditions · 
than do the 'airedales'. Being considered the 
elite comes at a price: aviators find them-
selves under intense scrutiny.-Only those who 
pass highly competitive aptitude and phys-
ical exam5 are considered for flight school. 
Even after an officer is selected to attend 
flightschool, there is a 'weeding out' process. 
Aviators. recall stories of flight instructors 
who deliberately try to challenge the student 
pilots, to 'stress (us) beyond our capacity' as 
one put it, 'to see if you can take it'. Students 
are taught a given number of maneuvers each 
day, and then are regularly tested to see if 
they can correctly perform the maneuvers, 
at firsHn simulators and later iri a training 
aircraft. Every training flight is graded by an 
instructor, who often yells at and belittles 
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students who make errors. A failure to 
adequately perform a maneuver is called a 
'down'. Every time a student receives a 
'down', he must appear before an attrition 
board made up of senior training officers in 
his squadron, who question· him about his 
knowledge of flight. procedures and deter-
mine if the student is fit to flv. Because the 
performance is so public, failing a flight test is 
humiliating. Few officers were willing to dis-
cuss the experience of failure in much detail, 
but those who did recalled these moments as 
very painful and isolating. One pilot recalled 
that his wife had just given birth to a new 
baby and he was very nervous. 'I was a 
bundle of nerves that day, our first child had 
just been born. We went flying and I did 
awful. He broadcast O\·er the radio in front of 
everyone, so they could all hear it, "We have 
a down." It was a kick in the ass.' Following 
this incident, this officer went to his room and 
'had a tantrum', destroying the room in a 'fit 
of anger and frustration'. He recalled it as one 
of the most humiliating and painful experi-
ences of his life. One of the contradictions 
inherent in this masculine culture is that, 
while the organization creates experiences of 
inevitable failure, there is no legitimate ,.,.a}! 
for members to justify failure. 
Flight instructors and attrition boards, in 
addition to testing for knowledge ofmaneu-
vers, also appraise the students' mental and 
emotional disposition. Capacity to analytic-
ally and rationally function under condition£ 
of considerable stress is one of the require .. 
ments for surviving flight school. 'Flight 
school is a weeding out proc,,ss. A lot of 
instructors are dicks. They want to see how 
much you can take. They ask you to do these 
maneuvers and if you blow it, they start 
screaming at you right there in the airplane.' 
The 'tough ones' learn to deal with these 
belittling gestures. One aviator,. Lt. Cdr. 
McCorkle, a for!Jler college football star and 
an F-18 attack pilot, described how he handled. 
the pressure by framing his instructors' 'tan-
trums' as 'a game'. • 
Maybe it was because I was used to getting 
yelled at in football practice by the coach, 
or getting yelled at by the upperclassmen at 
· the naval academy, but I just took it as ~ 
game. Some guys couldn't ta:ke it, they'd 
fold. You just learn to keep your mouth 
shut and take it. You're steaming on the 
inside. 
Previous masculinizing practices, in partic-
ular having a football coach who belittled and 
ridiculed the players, provided an anticipatory 
· socialization for Lt. Cdr. Mccorkle. In playing 
sports, judgement under pressure, stoic 
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courage, endurance of pain, and controlling 
emotion are all considered signs of manhood 
(Whitson 1990). Lt. Cdr. McCorkle's language 
is strikingly similar to that of male athletes 
who learn 'to take orders, to take pain, to 
"take out" the opponents' (Sabo 1992, p. 160). 
Successful pilots are the ones who demon-
strate that they can 'take it' without flinching, 
that they can continue to think analytically 
and suppress emotions. Lt. Cdr. Mccorkle 
described flying 300 miles off the coast of 
Japan at night, 250 miles from his aircraft 
carrier when his electrical systems began 
to malfunction. He had no instruments to 
track his velocity speed or altitude and had 
to perform various emergency procedures 
simultaneously to save the aircraft and return 
safely. In his words, 'Emotions are out of 
· place. You have to keep thinking and stay 
focused or you lose the aircraft. Every second 
is precious.' 
Organizational practices reinforce the 
status hierarchy that marks the risk-takers as 
elite. Upon graduating from flight school, 
each officer is continuously ranked against 
his/her peers. Those ranked highest receive 
priority in choosing the aircraft they wish to 
specialize in. They can choose jets, propeller 
planes, or helicopters, each with a different 
mission. 
As Foucault (1977) points out, power 
relations are embedded in processes of 
categorization and differentiation. Jet fighter 
pilots are seen as the most masculine and 
most prestigious. (Even among aviators, there 
is a status hierarchy based on risk taking and 
gender. jet pilots refer to helicopter pilots as 
'wimps'.) Even after the pilot receives his 
wings, the system of ranking and surveillance 
continues. For a jet pilot, successfully com-
pleting an aircraft carrier landing is an im-
portant rite of passage. This is known as a 
'trap' or an 'arrested landing' because the 
plane's momentum is halted by a ')'ire across 
the carrier, a very dangerous· operation, 
especially when landing at night. Each final 
approach and carrier landing is graded by 
the LSO (landing signal officer) on a scale of 
0 to 5. At the end of each tour of duty, patches 
(which are later attached to uniforms for all 
to see) are awarded to the five highest rated 
pilots in each squadron. 
The surveillance goes beyond formal rank-
ing. When a carrier is underway, all flight 
deck activity is filmed and telecast in the 
officers' wardroom. The pilots who are not 
flying that day often gather to watch the 
approaches and landings and talk about their 
colleagues' performance. Pilots who handle 
their approach well are lauded, just as those 
who make a 'shaky' approach often find 
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themselves the target of jokes and teasing. 
One officer said, 'Every time you come in, 
your buddies are watching you land, talking 
about if it's good form or not'. Statistics are 
tracked in a log book: how many hours of 
flight each pilot has; how many 'traps' and 
'cats' (a euphemism for being catapulted off 
the.carrier at takeoff); how many flight hours; 
how many combat hours. These statistics are 
posted on each pilot's fitness report and 
become a source of bragging rights. 
3. Masculinity and the surface warfare 
officer: enduring hardship and calmly 
demonstrating competence in the face 
of pressure 
Naval officers who operate surface ships -
destroyers, aircraft carriers - make up the 
largest community in the US Navy. \ Vhen life 
at sea is referred to as 'a man's job', the 
implication is that only rugged, robust char-
acters can thrive in such conditions. This is no 
life for the frail and weak. When discussing 
life on board ships, the officers described the 
physical conditions as stark and se,·ere. An 
officer shares a tiny room with one other 
officer, usually of equal rank. The bed is 
barely wide or long enough to hold a body. 
One officer described the formidable 
conditions: 
You run out of fresh milk ... You're drink-
ing powdered milk, powdered eggs ... You 
have to decide to store people and bullets 
or eggs. The water is a problem. You have 
to make your own on the ship .. . The 
boilers need water to make steam. They get 
it before we get it to drink or take showers. 
They often just shut off the water controls. 
A 'navy shower' is one _that takes two min~ 
utes ... Plus the ship is rocking so you're 
slipping and sliding. 
Life is described as physically strenuous 
and mentally exhausting. While at sea office:s 
rarely get adequate sleep. In addition to t'.'eir 
daily tasks ensuring that the engineenng, 
electrical, and weapons systems on board 
ship are in full operation, officers also must 
take turns standing watch on the bridge at 
night. Many said that if they average fo~r 
hours sleep per night, they are lucky. It IS 
not unusual for an officer to be awake for 
48 hours straight. This endurance is seen as 
commendable. One officer said, 'For two 
years on ship I think I never slept. I'd go 48 
hours with no sleep. But that's a sign of 
endurance. The XO says to me, "Now there's 
a man".' Another officer gave this description: 
'You stand watch about every three days. You 
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"et up at 2:30 in the morning and stand watch 
till 4 a.m. It's pitch black on the bridge ... 
The sound of the engine rumbling, it's very 
h\ -pnotizing. If you fall asleep and someone 
catches you, you get written up.' 
Many officers. told stories of being sub-
jected to a series of. tests and observations 
during their early careers a_t sea. In what they 
referred to as 'baptism by fire', they are 
'thrown into messes', difficult situations and 
maneuvers. Many of the men called these 
experiences 'deliberate set ups' in which their 
superiors put them through challenging 
situations 'just to see if (we) blow it'. A few 
echoed the experience of this officer, who 
described an early experience as a young 
ensign on board his first ship: 
My ·first ship, the CO stuck me up on the 
bridge. I was the steering control. I gave 
the commands,!' d tell them the speed, the 
course change, place the ship in position. It 
takes absolute concentration. I was scared 
to death, the ships could collide. It's part of 
the training. He sticks you up there to see 
if you blow it. The CO deliberately set up 
experiences like that. I qualified as a quart-
erdeck watch officer, the ceremonial watch 
on bridge for honors, ceremonies, thatkind 
of thing ... The CO said I was the finest 
ensign ever. When the second CO took over 
he asked the first 'who should I trust to 
drive this ship?' and the first one said it 
was me. I had the honor of driving the ship 
out for the brand new CO. The second CO 
asked me to stay. I was gung ho. 
This officer and his colleagues know the sym-
bolic significance of standing on the bridge . 
and steering the ship through the open ocean. 
It embodies the totalizing power of techno-
logy, an experience traditionally reserved for 
men (see Hacker 1989). And yet, this is not a 
task that is simply to be enjoyed. Many things 
could go wrong. Errors are highly conse-
quential in this culture; much of the territory 
through which these officers must navigate, 
both literally and metaphorically, is marked 
by lurking dangers: if the ships collide, 
careers would be terrnina !ed. Anxiety runs 
high, and yet it is necessary to maintain 
'absolute concentration', to prevent feelings 
of fear from interfering with performing 
the complex maneuvers correctly. The 
rewards for executing these tactics are highly 
public and coveted. Not only does the young 
ensign successfully achieve a 'qualification' 
to serve as quarterdeck officer, but he also 
becomes the officer in charge of piloting the 
ship during ceremonial operations, including 
the 'honor' of driving the ship out for the 
new CO. Masculinity in this culture is very 
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public, but never set:ure. It must be con-
tinually demonstrated. 
If passing these trials is a chance to display 
competence, they pale in comparison to the 
opportunity to excel under conditions of a 
real incident. Even under these conditions, 
however, one knows that one is the object of 
surveillance and evaluation, which even fur-
ther magnifies their significance, Lieutenant 
Junior Grade (Lt. J.G.) Ricky, was a 26 year· 
old division officer on. a ship in the Gulf for 
six months. One day he was officer on deck, 
in charge of driving the ship in the gulf, when 
he received a report that there were 14 people 
stranded in the water. (They were later dis-
covered to be 14 Iranians escaping from their 
homeland.) The ship was cruising off the 
coasts of Kuwait and Iran. Ricky describes the 
story in Vivid detail: 
We were off the edge. of a mine field along 
the coast of Kuwait. We were entering 
a dangerous zone and it was my show to 
run. The CO came up but he sat back and 
watched and let µi~ handle things. The · 
captain wanted me to be the officer and 
junior officer on deck - to drive the ship 
and run the rescue effort because the junior 
officer had made a minor mistake earlier. 
One failure is enough to create a reputation 
in this culture. When a real crisis emerges, 
the CO decides not to rely on this lieutenant's 
colleague, who had made a 'minor mistake' 
earlier. Everyone who is on deck at this 
moment knows that these are events that 
shape careers. This is the real thing, the op-
portunity to either shine or fail. But the other 
junior officer, having failed to demonstrate 
the ability to function competently under . 
pressure, will not get the chance. Lieutenant 
J .G. Ricky went on to describe the intensity 
of the action - the complex, simultaneous 
events that he had to control. 
I ordered the 'second engine full speed 
and called the CO.! called the [rescue] boat 
crew. You call the boat, the engineering 
plant, the combat info center, the radars. 
Tell them what to do ... I'm in direct contact 
with the helo (helicopter). I call flight quar-
ters - make sure the winds are correct so 
the helo can land. They had a search and 
rescue swimmer on board. He had to land 
the helo while doing 25 knots. It was a very 
fast speed trying to get a search and rescue 
out. I was getting constant status reports, 
coordinated everything. The CO said 
you've got it under control ... He let me 
handle the show ... We got all 14 of them 
out It .was high viz [high visibility] big 
time. 
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The experience of power and total control, the 
cool rationality engaged in the physical 
operation of levers, balances, dials, and swit-
ches are occasions for the display of mastery, 
(These experiences have traditionally been 
withheld from women [Hacker 1989).) The 
excitement associated with the possibility of 
danger and failure heighten the senses: some-
thing could go very wrong. He's displaying 
discipline and technical skill, coordination 
and agility of physical movements, rational 
processing of complex information under 
conditions of extreme stress. These are the 
qualities that define the terms of the gender 
hierarchy - not only between men and 
women but between groups of men. Not 
everyone on the bridge is seen as capable of 
executing these maneuvers. The lieutenant is 
under constant surveillance by his CO. The 
contrast between the 'real' experience and 
the drudgery of daily life on ship makes this 
significant. 
Before that it was just back and forth along 
the coast of Kuwait. The crew was excited. 
It lifted everybody's spirits, we actually did 
something. I did a really good job. There 
were a thousand things going on and I 
didn't miss a beat. The other officers came 
up and patted me on the back and said 
'good job'. The CO was excited too ... He 
got on the intercom system for the whole 
ship and announced BZ (Bravo Zulu) to 
Lt. J.G. Ricky for handling this. He con-
gratulated all the crews, but me personally 
. . . The admiral who was the task force 
commander sent a BZ letter to the ship. It 
was a big time for us. 
The Navy has an elaborate system of 
awards and rituals that reinforce the value of 
demonstrating mastery, especially successful 
performance under pressure. Jn part because 
of the letters of commendation from the Ad-
miral that followed this incident, and others 
like it, the captain of the ship was promoted, 
the lieutenant above was promoted, and 
other officers involved in the operation were 
highly commended. These organizational 
practices - surveillance, testing, recording, 
keeping career records - begin to shape and 
guide the passions of these men. They yearn 
for the opportunity to demonstrate prowess 
under pressure. 
Some of the officers interviewed said that 
these testing experiences should be a mascu-
line preserve. They expressed concern that 
women could not 'take it', could not tolerate 
the grueling conditions that the men suffer 
through, They fear that if women assume 
combat positions, they will be unable to han-
dle the pressure. One officer, c!iscussing the 
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challenge of taking command of a ship 
underway said, 'The first time some woman 
gets up there and cries because she can't 
stand the pressure, that's it. It's over for her 
and any other woman who tries to come up 
there'. A helicopter pilot recalled that when 
he was instructing a female student pilot on a 
maneuver, she lost one of the checkpoints and 
was unable to find her way. 
What would a man do? You'd just go back 
to the last check point until you find your 
way again. But she just lost it. She started 
crying and said 'I'm lost. I'm lost.' I took 
over the controls, but boy I laid into her 
when we got back. You can't do that. You 
have to separate your emotions and stay 
focused. That's what I worry about with 
women. 
Many echoed the'attitude of this officer, who 
has served on ships for 10 of his 15 years in 
the Navy: 'I'm tired of these women officers 
who are prissy bitches ... with hang nails 
... They don't pull their load. They might 
do special things for the CO on the side. I 
remember one would leave a shirt button 
undone and rub her breasts all over you.' 
4. Supply officers: masculinity as technical 
rationality 
With the advent of new technology, there is 
an increase in non-combatants and support 
services in militaries (Connell 1992). This 
has produced a new kind of masculinity, 
the professionalized calculative rationality. 
Seidler's (1989) study of the connection 
between masculinity, disembodied reason, 
and bureaucratic efficiency also supports this 
conclusion. 
Supply officers are considered 'non-
operational support' and occupy the lowest 
status in the Navy. They have fewer oppor-
tunities to demonstrate courage, autonomy, 
and perseverance, the hallmark of the hege-
monic ideal in this culture. The gendered 
nature of this status hierarchy is expressed in 
the derogatory terms used to describe supply 
officers. Combat specialists often refer to 
them as 'supply pussies' or 'suppo weenies'. 
One jet pilot described how the supply corps 
is viewed by aviators. 
The supply community is seen as reje<:ts. 
They're suppo weenies. They couldn't be 
aviators, couldn't do submarines. There's 
usually one or two of them on a ship 
and they're separate from the surface 
guys. They have nothing in common with 
them. They're always ostracized and 
different. There's no glory in their jobs ... 
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They have no fun. They do all these work-
ups that go on forever. 
Another. aviator described the supply 
commumty: . 
The supply guys are by themselves. They 
act like little dicks. You depend on them. 
They see themselves as lower on the totem 
pole so they act like little jerks to compen-
sate for their inferior feelings. They don't 
want to share their knowledge of the 
support system so people can't get around 
them. 
"fh!s is a fairly common appraisal of supply 
officers. The metonomy of small genitalia 
connotes a lack of virility and power in this 
culture. There's some irony in this. They do 
have power; as this a\·iator said, 'you depend 
on .them'. And some officers feel that supply 
of~cers ov•:rcompensate for feelings of in-
fenonty with regard to combat specialists 
by displaying power in other ways, such 
as withholding the flow of supplies and the 
appr?priation of funds. As a consequence, 
the !me officers are often careful to 'stay on 
their good side'. As one said, 'The suppo 
could be your best friend if you really need 
something'. 
The conferral of lo\ver status is not lost on 
the supply community. As one supply officer 
said: . 
Supply officers are considered staff. We are 
never allowed to command the vessel .. , 
[or] .to be risk takers. If you fly you get to 
deviate from the guidelines. They [avia-
tors] get to be more autonomous. We're like 
CPAs [certified public accountants]. We 
have to follow these rules and laws, not 
these general guidelines like the pilots. It 
looks boring. . . 
Unlike aviators and surface warfare officers, 
supply officers are not permitted the tradi-
tional masculine experiences: the opportunity 
to take risks, to command and be in charge, 
and to be autonomous. 
Supply officers employ a number of strat-
egies of s_elf-differentiation, a way to demon-
strate therr competence. One way is to achieve 
a superior ranking. Like all department 
heads, the supply officer is ranked agairlst 
other officers on the ship. Also, as a result of 
bi-annual fuSpections, each supply depart- · 
ment is rated against other ships' supply 
departments within the fleet. This becomes 
an important way to distinguish oneself, to 
stand o.ut from the others. One supply officer 
reported that his peak experience in the Navy 
was receiving recognition for running the 
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top-rated supply department of all the ships 
within his fleet. 
On one ship I headed, we gained fleet-wide 
notoriety for the ship. We caused the 
engineering department to pale in compar-
ison ... All my junior people got promoted 
as a result ... We were rated the best boat in 
the Pacific fleet. All the supply and food 
operations were rated the best. It's a very 
coveted award. 
The job of a supply officer is often one of 
material tracking, fiscal accounting, and 
administrative planning. The supply officer 
needs to know the status of every piece of 
equipment and every material part under his 
watchful eye. Inventory inspections. occur 
approximately once every six months and the 
supply officer is rated on how well 'he 
accounts for his equipment. Also, the supply 
corps is responsible for food operations on 
board ship. One supply officer descnbed his 
job this way: 'Every day you check the 
inventory. Sometimes there's 22,000 line items 
that have to be checked ... You have to make 
sure the food service spaces are immaculate.' 
Given that they keep the squadron well-
supplied, many supply officers echo the 
feelings of this officer, who argues that his job 
is . indispensable: 'Where would they be 
without us?' Many said that they deliberately 
chose the supply corps because it is excellent 
preparation for a career in the civilian secto~ 
'To manage $16 million when you're 25 years 
old - to have to balance to the penny - jet 
pilots can't do that'. Many are like this officer, 
a graduate of the Naval Academy who 
wanted to become •:Pilot, but due to football 
injuries was not permitted to assume a com-
bat specialty. He draws on masculine themes 
of rationality and responsibility as a source of 
identity. · 
The good suppo officer sees himself as a 
vital link. Okay;tomorrow you tell me how 
your life is without supply. They say, 
'You're just a chop' ['chopping on paper' is 
a demeaning reference to filling out forms 
and doing paperwork] ... They say [you're 
a suppo officer] because you're not physic-
ally qualified ... I did this because it's a 
good business move for after my Navy 
career. I get to manage people. I get to run 
information systems. It prepares me for the 
businessworld later - after I retire. 
This tone of apology and jilstification was 
heard from many of the non-combat males in 
support communities. This officer differenti-
ates his status in an area where he is able to 
exert control. For men like this, it is imposs-
ible to ignore the hegemonic masculine ideal 
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of control, autonomy, and authority. They 
may not fly a jet or command a ship, but 
they control people and information systems. 
The search for a stable masculine identity 
is embedded in a theme of upward mobil-
ity. This pre-occupation with hierarchical 
advancement and competition for career 
progress is a common theme of middle-class 
men in organizations (Collinson and Heam 
1994) and was commonly heard among sup-
ply officers. 
Conclusion 
Critical men's studies view masculinity as 
dynamic patterns of ideologies and practices 
constructed in interaction. In this vein, 
Coltrane (1994) argued for comparative 
studies that challenge a 'falsely universal-
izing concept of gender'. However, Collinson 
and Heam (1994) warn against treating 
multiple masculinities as another set of static 
categories. Instead, they encourage the study 
of the dynamic, shifting, and contradictory 
character of gender relations. Specifically, 
they contend, it is important to attend to the 
construction of unities, differences, and inter-
relationships between men. For this reason, 
it is important to pay attention to men's 
location within the structure of the gender 
order. 
In this article, I have taken such a relational 
perspective on the construction of gender and 
explored alternative masculinities within the 
US Navy. There are a number of different 
strands of hegemonic masculinity that these 
officers can draw upon to secure masculine 
identity. These themes include: risk taking; 
discipline; excitement a~sociated with opera-
tion of powerful technology; tolerance of 
degradation; stoic endurance of hardship; 
tenacity and perseverance in the face of 
difficult physical trials; rational calculation; 
absence of emotion; and technological mast-
ery. While this article has focused on differ-
ences between occupational specialties, there 
are also variations withln these groups, a 
theme to be addressed in another paper. To 
illustrate, risk taking is a high value in this 
culture and not the exclusive privilege of 
aviators. One supply officer said, for exam-
ple, 'If there's a fire on board ship, I want the 
CO to know that I'll risk climbing in there to 
save someone just like anybody else'. How-
ever, these officers' discourses are constrained 
and facilitated by the resources available 
within various communities. While aviators 
have more opportunities to display risk tak-
ing, surface warfare officers have opportun-
ities to demonstrate physical hardships and · 
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grueling work schedules, and supply officers 
frequently have more opportunity· to display 
rational calculation and responsibility for 
resources. By focusing on the themes within 
each organizational community, I have drawn 
attention to the importance of organizational 
position in constructing a masculine strategy. 
Besides the opportunities and limitations 
nested within organizational positions, these 
officers attempt to secure a masculine identity 
in contrast to others. Aviators are seen as 'the 
elite' in relation to surface warfare officers 
and supply officers, who suffer harsh condi-
tions and bureaucratic surveillance but who 
rarely experience the autonomy, the thrill and 
the glory of high-tech flying. Surface warfare 
officers consider their jobs 'manly' because 
they survive more rugged conditions and en-
dure more intense competition than do other 
officers. Supply officers often distinguish 
themselves as technical specialists preparing 
for a successful business career. 
Holvever, one cannot overloOk hOw mascu-
line hegemony becomes a successful strategy 
for subordinating women. All of the mascu-
linities achieve meaning in contrast to defini-
tions of femininity. In men's interviews, 
women are depicted as· emot~onally unstable, 
less able to endure physical challenges, and 
unable to tolerate the harsh conditions of ship 
life. This is consistent with western masculine 
socialization, in which boys learn that being a 
man has no other definition than not being a 
woman: 'This notion of anti-femininity lies 
at the heart of contemporary and historical 
conceptions of manhood, so that masculinity 
is defined more by what one is not rather than 
what one is' (Kimmel 1994, p. 126). One re-
cent reView of research on women's increased 
participation in. militaries of western nations 
concludes that in addition to experiencing 
limited career opportunities, women are 
often depicted as 'innately unsuited', lacking 
aggression, discipline, and commitment 
(Chandler et al. 1995). The authors suggest 
that this construction may have consequences 
for American naval women now able to serve 
on board surface ships - perhaps they will 
be limited to peripheral support tasks or 
'women-friendly' tasks such as supply and 
communications. 
There is a contradiction between the 
masculine display of rugged individualisn;/ 
autonomy and the subordination and surveil-
lance to which all military personnel are 
subject. These officers are hardly free and 
autonomous, a traditionally core feature. of 
masculine hegemony. Officers must fi~d 
other modes of expression of non-conformity, 
which might explain some of the wild, 'un-
civil' behavior that occurs at social events and 
\ti Blackwell Publishers Ltd.1996 
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parties, including the scandalous sexual 
escapades that occurred at the 1991 Tailhook 
. convention (Tailhook Report 1993). This also 
might explain the intensity with which 
women are 'othered'. Discipline, obedience, 
compliance, and exacting detail, ideals that 
are depicted as 'tough' and masculine, depend 
upon contrasting images of the feminized-
'other' - being undisciplined, scattered, 
emotional, unreliable. Homosexuals. have 
also been 'othered' using these terms. For 
years, one of the core arguments for exclud-
ing homosexuals from military service was 
their lack of discipline and unreliability -
it was feared that they would be a security 
:isk (Herek 1993, 1990). The argument here is 
:hat the more the masculine theme of 
:liscipline and endurance is emphasized, the 
.ess important it is to exhibit autonomy arid 
ndependent control. One way to emphasize 
jiscipline, endurance, and rationality as 
nasculine traits is to depict lack of discipline, 
mreliability, and emotion as feminine. 
There is another contradiction at the heart 
Jf this culture that suggests attempts to 
ichieve a_ secure masculine identity create 
:onditions that undermine the possibility of 
;uch an achievement. The military life is very 
lemanding. Every officer; at some point(s) in 
lis career, is likely to experience degradation 
ind humiliation that often accompany contin-
_1al surveillance, testing, ranking, gru_eling 
ife conditions, and the constant possibility 
>f failure. This study suggests that their in-
·estrnent in masculine discourse is a strategy 
hey employ to compensate for these negative 
•xperiences: one way to o\·ercome subjective 
nsecurity is to re-interpret the tolerance of 
;rueling conditions and constant surveillance 
•S manly experiences. ('This is so awful and 
>ainful that most can't tolerate it, but I've 
hown I can take it'.) 
But as Collinson (1992) demonstrated in his 
· .tudy of masculinity among manual laborers, 
uch efforts are precarious. Depending on 
·xtemal confirmation - the approval of a 
ommanding officer, the awarding of a sur-
ace warfare pin, promotion, the accolades of 
>eers ~ to affirm and re-affirm to themselves 
·.nd others w,ho and what they are, is poten-
ially self-defeating. Preoccupation with dif-
erentiating self and discounting others 
·reates an enduring sense of subjective in-
ectirity. This persistent sense of fragility and 
>recariousness generates a greater need to 
lisplay worth. Such defensive posturing -
lifferentiating self by out-performing others, 
·alidating self by negating others - is not 
>nly unlikely to lead to the achievement of a 
ecure identity, it creates the very social con-
litions that drive men to strive for a chance to 
'Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1996 
demonstrate exceptiona!ity. These officers are 
chronically aware that their peers are eager 
to surpass them. The achievement of mascu-
linity in.this culture is never secure. It must 
be continually confirmed and exhibited. This 
follows Collinson's conclusion that a culture 
that encourages continual comparison 
;recreates the social insecurity it is intended to 
transcend' (1992, p. 97). 
The military is a gendered institution. Its 
structure, practices, values, rites, and rituals 
reflect accepted notions of masculinity and 
femininity. But it is also a gendering institu-
tion. It helps to create gendered identities .. 
This article discusses the various power 
struggles and obstacles that surround men's 
practices, as well as the multiple strategies of 
assertion and differentiation male officers en-
act in attempts to secure a masculine identity. 
Since upholding a hegemonic ideal of mascu-
linity takes collective effort, a second locus of 
this study has been the organizational rules, 
practices, and structures, particularly the sys-
tems.of ranking and testing, that contribute to 
the construction of the hegemonic ideal. 
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